Analysis of ‘Poor Things’ through the Feminist Reinterpretation of Spinoza

In my previous article, I analysed the magnificent film directed by Yorgos Lanthimos, Poor Things. I explored the concept of ‘body-without-organs’ as developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In this essay, I will approach the film through the feminist reinterpretation of Spinozian monism.

Spinoza’s Challenge to Cartesian Dualism and Feminist Thought

Spinoza’s philosophy, particularly his challenge to Cartesian mind-body dualism, holds profound implications for feminist thought. His assertion that the mind and body are the same substance offers a radical departure from the hierarchical dualisms that have historically marginalised anything associated with the ‘feminine,’ including the body, emotion, and the material world. This section expands on Spinoza’s philosophy and its reinterpretation by feminist thinkers, notably Moira Gatens, who engage with Spinoza’s ideas to critique patriarchal structures and offer nuanced perspectives on gender, power, and agency.

Critique of Cartesian Dualism and Its Implications for Gender Hierarchies

In the Cartesian framework, there is a clear dichotomy where the mind, associated with reason, autonomy, and a supposedly ‘masculine’ essence, is valorized over the body, which is seen as the site of emotion, passivity, and mortality – traits culturally coded as ‘feminine.’ This mind/body split has not only contributed to the subjugation and marginalization of women but also to the broader devaluation of the body and the material world. Feminist critics like Genevieve Lloyd and Susan Bordo have articulated how this dualism perpetuates gender hierarchies and reinforces patriarchal structures (Lloyd, 1994; Bordo, 1987).

This dichotomy not only instils a gender hierarchy but also contributes to the marginalisation of women and the ‘feminine,’ linking back to historical phenomena like the witch hunts, where women, often identified with the body and nature, were viewed as threats to the rational, patriarchal society (Merchant, 1980).

Spinoza’s philosophy, however, offers a potent antidote to these dualisms. His monism — the idea that there is only one substance and that mind and body are simply different attributes of this substance — challenges the hierarchical ordering of mind over body. This perspective is not merely a philosophical stance but a profound statement against the gendered valuations that have historically oppressed women and the ‘feminine.’

Feminist Reinterpretation of Spinoza: Moira Gatens and the Redefinition of Agency and Power

Moira Gatens, in her engagement with Spinoza, brings these ideas into the realm of feminist thought. She argues that Spinoza’s conception of the body and mind provides a more fluid and dynamic understanding of human agency and identity, one that is not confined by rigid gender binaries. Gatens notes: ‘Spinoza’s theory of the affects… provides a way of understanding how individuals are affected by and affect others in both beneficial and harmful ways’ (Gatens, 2004, p. 529). This understanding of individuals as networks of relationships and affections offers a radical rethinking of autonomy, identity, and power, themes central to feminist critiques of patriarchal structures.

Gatens further explores the implications of Spinoza’s concept of conatus, the striving of each thing to persevere in its being, for understanding agency and power in a way that is not premised on domination or hierarchy. This perspective aligns with feminist efforts to conceptualize power and agency in non-coercive, non-hierarchical terms. As Gatens explicates: ‘For Spinoza, power, or the capacity to affect and be affected, is not a possession… it is an expression of the relational nature of individuals’ (Gatens, 2004, p. 539). This conception of power as relational and immanent offers a compelling framework for rethinking feminist politics and ethics.

In summary, Spinoza’s philosophy, particularly as it is reinterpreted by feminist thinkers like Moira Gatens, offers a rich and radical resource for challenging patriarchal structures and thinking anew about gender, power, and agency. By rejecting the Cartesian mind-body dualism and embracing a more integrated, relational understanding of human beings, Spinoza and his feminist interlocutors provide a potent critique of gender hierarchies and a promising pathway for envisioning a more just and equitable world.

Poor Things: A Cinematic Exploration of Spinozian and Feminist Thought

Emma Stone as Bella Baxter in Poor Things (2023).
Emma Stone as Bella Baxter in Poor Things (2023).

The 2023 film Poor Things can be viewed as a compelling narrative and visual embodiment of the themes central to Spinoza’s philosophy and its feminist reinterpretation.

Poor Things stars Emma Stone as Bella Baxter, a woman reborn with an infant’s consciousness, and Willem Dafoe as Dr. Godwin Baxter, her creator. In a world brimming with intrigue and self-discovery, Bella’s journey intertwines with Duncan Wedderburn, a charismatic lawyer played by Mark Ruffalo, leading to a deep exploration of identity and autonomy.

The film, through its character development, narrative structure, and visual style, mirrors the philosophical discourse on the unity of mind and body, the dynamic nature of agency, and the critique of patriarchal structures.

Bella’s Journey of Self-Discovery and Agency

Emma Stone as Bella Baxter in Poor Things (2023).
Emma Stone as Bella Baxter in Poor Things (2023).

Bella’s character arc in Poor Things reflects Spinoza’s notion of the unity of mind and body. Her evolution from a reanimated being to a sentient, autonomous individual challenges the Cartesian separation of mind and body, presenting a powerful narrative of their interconnectedness. Scenes depicting Bella’s awakening and her quest for knowledge and experience symbolize her conatus, her inherent striving for self-preservation and empowerment. This transformation from a passive object to an active, self-determining subject resonates deeply with Gatens’ feminist reinterpretation of Spinoza, highlighting a journey of emancipation and self-realization.

Visual Style and Symbolic Representation

Bella allows her body to lead her in this surreal dance scene.

The film’s visual style subtly but powerfully reinforces the Spinozian and feminist themes. The interplay of light and shadow, the attention to corporeal detail, and the portrayal of the characters’ physicality emphasize the materiality of the body, aligning with the Spinozian view of the body as an integral, experiencing aspect of the self. The cinematography not only captures the external journey of the characters but also reflects their internal, psychological landscapes, visualizing the complex interplay between mind, body, and environment.

Interpersonal Dynamics and the Theory of Affects

Poor Things also explores the complexities of relationships and the fluid nature of power and agency, mirroring Gatens’ exploration of Spinoza’s theory of affects. The film portrays a spectrum of interpersonal dynamics, from nurturing to controlling, reflecting the myriad ways individuals affect and are affected by each other. Bella’s interactions, particularly with characters like Duncan Wedderburn, illustrate the negotiation of power, autonomy, and identity, underscoring her striving for a life that is not defined by external control but shaped by her desires, intellect, and will.

Bella Baxter (Emma Stone) negotiates her power, autonomy, and identity.

Concluding Thoughts

In summary, Poor Things emerges as a profound cinematic exploration of feminist philosophy, reflecting and embodying Spinoza’s critique of Cartesian dualism and its feminist reinterpretation. The film, through its narrative depth, visual symbolism, and character portrayal, offers a vivid exploration of identity, agency, and the reclaiming of the body from patriarchal narratives, making it a significant cultural artefact in the discourse of feminist philosophy and a testament to the enduring relevance of Spinoza’s thought in contemporary narrative and visual arts.

Bibliography:

Bordo, S. (1987). The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture. State University of New York Press.


Gatens, M. (2004). Spinoza’s Disturbing Thesis: Power, Norms, and Fiction in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. History of Political Thought, 25(4), 529-556.


Lloyd, G. (1994). Part of Nature: Self-Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics. Cornell University Press.


Merchant, C. (1980). The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution. Harper & Row.